ABSTRACT: This paper identifies the key assumptions of the U.S. Government regarding Iraq, evidence to prove these assumptions and how it effects the Middle East within the context of the Thomas Barnett's Global Transaction Strategy. Most interestingly, this paper brings to light a 1991 Harvey Starr study on Democratic Spatial Diffusion supporting the notion of a "Democratic Domino Effect".

The assumptions proclaims that a free Iraq will galvanize democratic reform throughout the Middle East, not only bringing liberal democracy but a democratic zone of peace in the Middle East. Thus, U.S. intervention aiding in the creation of a liberal democratic Iraq is key in bringing not only liberalism to the region, but in essence exporting a new regime of strategic security to the Middle East.

This paper was published in the Spring 2004 edition of San Francisco State University's International Relations Journal.

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NOTE: This paper is a rough draft submitted to San Franciso State University's International Relations Journal for Fall 2004. This paper is a rough draft, released with worts and all.

Introduction

On April 09, 2003, people the world over saw the fall of the Saddam Hussein statue in Firdos Square in Baghdad, heralding the establishment of an Iraq liberated from the grips of Saddam Hussein.[1] A year later, we are now in what Defense Secretary Defense Donald Rumsfeld  described as “the long hard slog.”[2] Coalition forces and Iraqi civilian causalities continue to mount

as U.S. and Iraq nears the June 30 handover deadline. With causalities growing daily, no weapons of mass destruction (WMD) yet to be found, and dissatisfaction with the US occupation manifesting itself in the Sadr upraising, the Bush administration is beginning to lose the support of the American public.

Moving beyond the current mainstream discussion concerning the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, this paper seeks to reexamine the affair within the framework of our long-term strategy for the Middle East, confirming that the creation of a liberal democratic Iraq would galvanize democratic reform in the region, not only bringing liberal democracy but a democratic zone of peace. Indeed, this paper will further argue that any failure in Iraq will not be due to any false premises that motivated the invasion, but rather tragic policy failures stemming from disastrously poor post-war reconstruction planning.

Utilizing empirical evidence, this paper seeks to outline and analyze the “grand assumptions” of U.S. policymakers in the context of creating a “new” Middle East, while incorporating the theory of democratic spatial diffusion effect (also known as the democratic domino effect) to show how it would help a liberated Iraq serve as an example for democracy in the region and pave the way for a new security framework. Indeed, it can be said that the U.S. intervention in Iraq is a grand experiment in bringing forth democracy throughout the world.

Indeed, the end game is that a free Iraq will galvanize democratic reform throughout the Middle East, not only bringing liberal democracy but a democratic zone of peace. Thus, U.S. intervention aiding in the creation of a liberal democratic Iraq is key in bringing not only liberalism to the region, but in essence exporting a new regime of strategic security to the Middle East. It is a grand realignment of geopolitics in the Middle East and repaving the future for over 300 million people.

United States Perspectives and the Grand Assumptions on Iraq and the Middle East

The best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere. Democracies don't attack each other.

 President Bill Clinton, January 1994[3]

Speculations over the reasons for the war in Iraq are as numerous as are the “No War in Iraq” protest signs. What has been agreed, however, is that the war has brought neo-conservatism back into the spotlight. Neoconservatives first appeared in the 1970s as an intellectual revolt against the fervent Marxism of the era, synthesizing a worldview based on a strand of liberalism that is not afraid of the use of force and borrows heavily form Trotskyism.[4] This assertive Wilsonian ideology has been represented by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who has been identified as the neoconservative force behind the war in Iraq.

William Kristol and Robert Kagan outlined the neoconservative foreign policy in “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy” (Foreign Affairs, Jul/Aug 1996), stating that “American foreign policy should be informed with a clear moral purpose” of “actively promoting American principles of governance abroad--democracy, free markets and respect for liberty.”[5] Not only are these values universal, Kristol argues, but America must "contain or destroy many of the world's monsters", those defiant against American and core Western values, as the "responsibility for the peace and security of the international order rests so heavily on America's shoulders."[6] Though a bold and aggressive statement, it is similar to what President Bill Clinton stated during his State of the Union speech in 1994 (as noted above), and indeed, draws itself from the Truman Doctrine declaration that “[one] of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion.”[7]

How does such theory and values apply to Iraq and the Middle East? As the U.S. bears the burden of the guarantor of global stability, the Middle East presents an enormous challenge. It is strategically valuable, for its vast energy resources, yet also a dangerous source of continuing instability. Both Wilsonians and neoconservatives will agree that the instability in the Middle East rest upon the utter lack of liberalism. What flows from the need for liberalism are the grand assumptions behind the Bush policy on Iraq and the Middle East: 1) The tyranny of Saddam Hussien was an obstacle for liberalization of Iraq, arguably the geopolitical center of the Middle East. 2) Establishment of democracy in Iraq would lead to a “domino effect” in the region 2) The creation of democracy in the Middle East would bring with it a new stable and lasting security regime.

 

Thomas Barnett, Grand Transaction and the Gap

The assumptions on Iraq are neatly summed up by Dr. Thomas Barnett’s theory of Grand Transaction. Dr. Barnett is a professor at the U.S. Naval War College in Rhode Island. He is a consultant to the Department of Defense on issues relating to the impact of globalization and is serving as the Assistant for Strategic Futures at the Office of Force Transformation at the Department of Defense. The Office of Force Transformation is responsible for creating the “Army of the Future” built on the Objective Force and the doctrine of Rapid Dominance (Shock and Awe).

Though the neoconservative persuasion[8] serves as his general framework, Dr. Barnett has gone further and articulated a vision that builds upon Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington and Tom Friedman; Dr. Barnett’s theory is an amalgamation of several other theories, specifically the muscular liberalism akin to Tom Friedman’s, the Democratic Peace Theory and Democratic Special Diffusion effect (Democratic Domino Effect). From the standpoint of Grand Transaction Strategy theory, the world is seen as divided into two halves: the core and the non-integrating gap states. Dr. Barnett states that the “new world must be defined by where globalization has truly taken root and where it has not.”

Figure 1: Core versus Gap States[9]

The core states are those that are integrated with the world economy and embrace ideals of liberalism: free market, free media, free trade, transparency, et cetera (see Figure 1, with “Core states” highlighted). The liberal core states are within the zone of democratic peace. As Dr. Barnett states “[s]how me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder.”[10] Thus, globalization – importantly, the cultural, economic and political connectivity that it brings – is fundamental to bringing forth stability and prosperity to states, regions and the entire world.

Non-integrating gap states, however, are everything but that. They are non-liberal states that either do not embrace or wholly oppose the important elements of liberalism. These gap states, according to Dr. Barnett’s theory, define the current strategic threat to the international security environment. As Barnett proclaims:

Show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and—most important—the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists.[11]

Such states exist in the following regions: the Caribbean Rim, virtually all of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and much of Southeast Asia. Thus, according to Barnett’s theory, the level of globalization is distinctly linked to strategic security.

In short, today, the level of strategic security is directly linked to the level of globalization. This is no difference. What September 11^th has done is further highlight the great schism between core and non-integrating states. Indeed, the Bush Administrations’ National Strategy for Combating Terrorism points to fostering “economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law”  as key to creating stability.[12]

Grand Transaction Applied and U.S. Assumptions in Iraq

The application of Barnett’s theory towards the Middle East Iraq in particular falls neatly within the U.S. assessment and assumptions on the effects of the “liberated” Iraq. According to Global Transaction theory, Saddam Hussein stood in the way of not only a liberated Iraq, but also the realization of a liberal transformation in the Middle East. As for assumptions of Saddam Hussein himself, he was not only a barrier to liberalization but was a tyrant on par with Stalin.

When Wolf Blitzer of CNN asked Barnett if U.S. intervention in Iraq would transform state in the region into “vital democratic robust nations”, Barnett stated that the Saddam Hussein regime was the “biggest security impediment” in the Middle East and that when removed would “eliminate that source of conflict” and facilitate the “integrat[ion] part of the world that over the past several decades has woefully underperformed economically”.[13]

According to Dr. Barnett, and many in the U.S. government, the Middle East is ripe for the liberal transformation, yet it lacks the proper impetus to do so. He cites Qatar, Jordon and Iran as examples of where perestroika appears to be right around the corner. The barrier to such transformation was the Saddam Hussein-led Iraq. The removal of Saddam Hussein would build tremendous pressure for reform throughout the Middle East with the help of a strong American presence and the establishment of a free and democratic Iraq.

 

Grand Assumptions on Iraq

Assumption One: Saddam Hussein is a Tyrant

“And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them.”

- President Bill Clinton, December 1998[14]

In the past decade, the U.S. leadership has been clear about its perception of Saddam Hussein. President Bill Clinton described Saddam Hussein-led Iraq as participating in an “unholy axis”[15] and President George W. Bush extended the “axis” imagery to describe Iraq as a member of an “axis of evil.”[16] Indeed, the last three U.S. Presidents have carried military actions against Saddam Hussein and have repeatedly worked for Saddam’s removal.

Beyond President George W. H. Bush involvement in Iraq, President Clinton first major political action as newly elected president in January 1993 was the launching of joint U.S.-UK-French air strikes against Iraq for violating U.N. sanctions.[17] This was the first acts of many, as Clinton had ordered air strikes against Iraq for U.N. sanctions violations again in September 06, 1996[18], November 13, 1998[19] and December 16, 1998[20]. In addition, both President Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have funded programs aimed at supporting resistance groups to topple Saddam Hussein.[21]

The tyrannical nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, his belligerent behavior towards the international community, and the violent oppression of those under his rule have been well documented. He has defied over a dozen U.N. Security Council resolutions, actions which led to a few U.S.-led strikes against Iraq under President Clinton. The Saddam regime is believed to have left as many as 300,000 Iraqis murdered and buried in mass grave sites throughout the country[22] and to have used biochemical weapons against his own population.[23] The words of Scott Ritter, the former chief UN weapons inspector, highlight the depravity of the regime:

Such descriptions are representative of the systematic human rights abuses under the authoritative Saddam Hussein regime

Beyond human rights, political rights were also severely curbed. Presidential elections in Iraq have been obviously been staged. During the last presidential election in October 2002, Saddam Hussein received 100 percent of the votes with 100 percent turnout, improving over the 1995 elections of 99.96 percent vote for Saddam Hussein with 99 percent turnout.[25] The Daily Telegraph claimed that the 2002 election victory were the “first unanimous vote in electoral history” beating North Korea’s 1962 election where Kim Il-Sung received 100 percent of the vote but with less than 100 percent turnout.[26]

In a future without Saddam Hussein and in the hands of Iraqis, the Iraqi government is expected to move towards a more liberal, pluralistic government. In a 2003 Gallup poll, an overwhelming number of Iraqis supported a multiparty parliamentary democracy with 42 percent of those surveyed expected to have such a system of government in five years. [27] None of those surveyed expected to see government like that in Saudi Arabia, Taliban Afghanistan and only 12 percent expected to see a government modeled after Iran.[28] These findings are similar to those found by the U.N. Human Development Programme’s  “Arab Human Development Report 2003” that found that those in Arab countries more than all other regions saw democracy as the best form of government (over 60 percent) and fully reject authoritarian rule (nearly 80%, higher than Western Europe and North America).[29] Indeed, such findings show that Iraq and the Middle East are ripe and overdue for a transformation to liberalism and democracy.

Assumption Two: A Liberal Iraq as a Force of Transformation

“The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”

- President Bush, November 2003[30]

Central to the US motivation for waging war in Iraq is the belief in the creation of a democratic domino effect transforming the entire Middle East into a liberal democracy. This belief has been reiterated by many members of the current Bush Administration, including Vice-President Cheney and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz. Wolfowitz stated that a free Iraq would “cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, across the whole Arab world,” challenging the non-liberal policies of the region.[31] In November 2003, President Bush announced that “the establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.”[32] There is no doubt that, at least in rhetoric, the United States government has proclaimed the promise of a democratic domino effect.

Many in the American media have been skeptical of the possibility of the democratic domino effect, especially since the leaked report from the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research saw that “liberal democracy [in the region] will be difficult to achieve.”[33] The title of the report itself, “Iraq, the Middle East and Change: No Dominoes,” shows the uncertainty many feel that a wave of liberalism will engulf the region.

Despite this, however, there is evidence that a democratic spatial diffusion effect, as it is called in academic circles, does indeed exists. In June 1991, Dr. Harvey Starr, a professor at the University of South Carolina, published his findings regarding a statistical analysis of all countries from the period of 1974 to 1987 and found that indeed both at a regional-level and individual state-level of analysis there existed effects that could be described as correlating of the diffusion of democratic reform.[34]

Dr. Starr used annual data from Freedom House to create a scale of political rights and civil liberties. Freedom House uses a seven-point scale to classify states as either “free” (F), “partially free” (PF), or “nonfree” (NF). Starr used the data from the periods of 1974-1980 and 1981-1997 to study whether there existed a strong correlation between: 1) a state undergoing governmental transition and a state undergoing similar effect within its region and 2) a state undergoing governmental transitional and a neighboring state undergoing similar effect. He focused his efforts on analyzing the spatial diffusion effect on countries bordering governmental transitions (BGT) – that is, a country neighboring one undergoing a political transformation. Conducting a chi-square test, Dr. Starr found substantial correlation between a country undergoing a governmental transition and its neighbours undergoing governmental transition. One of the chi-square matrices by Dr. Star is reproduced below:

Figure 2: BGT Analysis - Government Transitions Only[35]

What the table (Figure 2) reveals is a link between a democratic transition in one country and the spread of a similar effect to its neighbors. For example, looking at the first row of the matrix above, we see that a positive diffusion effect – towards the democratic values of civil and political freedoms – with 25 out of 79 (or 32%) countries bordering a country that have previously undergone positive governmental transition.[36] The 32% chance that a country will positive transition does not seem like a very high number, but when one takes into account that there is only a 6.5% probability of a country bordering a country experiencing a governmental transition, the probability of a democratic transition does seem high indeed.

In addition, we can see that the spatial diffusion effect is somewhat of a two-way street. Looking at the second row of the matrix, we see that a 12 out 52 countries – or 23% - experience a negative transition when bordering a country that underwent a negative transition. However, according to Dr. Starr’s data, the flows towards civil and political freedoms are stronger than those of the flow towards restriction.

Dr. Starr found that 77 countries did undergo governmental transitions without a neighbour undergoing a similar change, yet 31 of these countries were islands, archipelago or peninsulas with only one border; thus, the possibility of these 31 countries experiencing any BGT treatments due to a spatial diffusion effect are very slim – as they have either zero or one neighboring country.[37]

It is clear that Dr. Starr’s report has several short falls. In addition to being but a single study, its dependence on the somewhat subjective “ranking” of civil and political freedoms from Freedom House may also be criticized. There is also an assumption that increased civil and political freedoms are related to the “level” of democracy in the region. Nevertheless, the study presents a challenge to those who quickly dismiss and deride the notion of the democratic domino effect. It does demonstrate the existence evidence that a change towards democratic reforms in one country heightens the statistical possibility that democratic reform will spread to its neighbors. The existence of such correlation is behind the US hopes that the establishment of a democratic regime in Iraq could facilitate the spread of liberalism through the Middle East.

 

Assumption Three: Creating a Zone of Democratic Peace in the Middle East

As mentioned earlier, the ultimate long-term policy goal of exporting democracy to Iraq is the establishment of a new security regime in the region built upon a “democratic peace.” Thus the goal of creation a democratic Iraq serves to act as the first domino in ushering democracy and liberalism to the region. The notion of creation peace through democracy is not new to U.S. policy. Indeed, one could argue that it is one of the main characteristics of American foreign policy. Continuing the legacy of Woodrow Wilson, the last ten years of American leadership firmly reflect the faith of liberalism and the enduring peace it is believed to provide. In his 1994 State of the Union Address President, President Bill Clinton made the bold proclamation that “democracies don’t make war with each other” and that U.S. foreign policy must drive to increase the zones of democratic peace.[38] President George W. Bush’s repeated this rhetorical tone declaring that the “success in Iraq would also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace”[39] and that "we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”[40]

The underpinnings for this faith in democratic peace can be traced back to the 18^th century philosopher Immanuel Kant and his book Perpetual Peace.[41] The defining elements of a Kantian regime of Perpetual Peace are the existence of a federation of republic states (defined as having separate executive and legislature) that are economically interdependent and bound by international law. Indeed, these three characteristics very much define the liberal ideal of a democratic peace, with the exception of favoring a liberal democracy over a republic.

Democratic Peace Theory is not without its controversy, yet there has been a wealth of studies utilizing various statistical analyses that give weight to its claims. At the very least, these studies demonstrate that countries with a certain defined level of democracy either do not go to war with each other or engage only in brief low-level conflict. In his ground-breaking 1972 study, Dean Babst concluded that “no wars have been fought between independent nations with elective governments between 1789 and 1941.”[42] In a more recent study, James Lee Ray published a 243-page report supporting democratic peace, finding that “states that have achieved a certain level of democracy…have never fought each other.”[43] Numerous other studies based on data and operational definitions from the Correlates of War – a 30-year project collecting quantitative data on the causes of war – project have found similar findings.[44]

Thus, the pursuit of democracy in Iraq and in the Middle East goes beyond seeking to spread the values of liberalism, but serves as a vision for a new security regime in the region. U.S. has its interests to see democracy and liberalism in the region not only because of its values, but also because it seeks lasting stability in the region.

The Other Assumptions on Iraq, or Why We are Failing in Iraq

As outlined in this paper, the war in Iraq is built upon a larger framework of a strategic vision in the Middle East, based upon the grand assumptions of the need to remove Saddam Hussein to bring liberalism to Iraq, the creation of a liberal Iraq as an impetus for transformation in the entire region, and the belief that this transformation will establish a democratic zone of peace in the Middle East. While this framework is just and valid, the policy created to carry this vision is wrought with failures. The biggest flaw has been the Bush Administration’s incompetence in the reconstruction efforts, stemming from a Defense Department role in Iraqi war planning and reconstruction efforts.

The whole operation has been marked by a struggle between the Defense and State Department over who was supposed to govern Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein and how to plan the arduous plan for reconstruction. Pentagon had long backed the Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the London-based umbrella group called the Iraqi National Congress (INC), as their choice for leading a post-war Iraq and also their main source for intelligence regarding Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, favored a military-led government that would come to include local Iraqi leaders, especially religious leaders like Shia spiritual leader Sayyid Ali al-Sistani.[45] The State Department had also developed its own team of experts, separate from those solely based by the INC, to plan the reconstruction effort.[46] Yet, ultimately, it was the Defense Department that won the battle. As David Rieff of the New York Times wrote, not only did the Defense Department take the lead in the reconstruction but Ahmad Chalabi’s “Iraq National Congress became not simply an Iraqi exile group of which Chalabi was a leader, but a kind of government-in-waiting with Chalabi at its head.”[47] This is not too surprising, considering Chalabi reportedly built very close ties with those in the Bush Administration, most notably Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and other highly influential insiders such as Richard Perle and Douglas Feith the Under-Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Blind Faith in the Iraqi National Congress: The Consequences

As one example of his faith in the INC, Rumsfeld reportedly issued a memo in early April 2003 seeking the establishment of an embryonic Iraqi government to be deployed in Iraq in areas under U.S control even before combat mission had ended.[48] On April 6, Chalabi along with 700 INC fighters (dubbed the “Free Iraqi Forces”) were deployed by the United States to the area surrounding the city of Nasiriya as part of a succession of INC deployments aimed to become the beginnings of a new Iraqi government.[49] Originally, the INC forces, trained by the U.S. Army, were enthusiastically called by U.S. Marine General Peter Pace, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the vanguard of what “will become basically the core of the new Iraqi army.”[50] To severe American disappointment, Chalabi and the INC forces found no substantial support among Iraqis. The Congressional Research Services (CRS) released a report to Congress finding that: “Since Chalabi returned to Iraq, there have been no large public demonstrations supportive of him or the INC, indicating that he might not have a large following inside Iraq.”[51] Thus, it became widely apparently that a significant miscalculation had occurred. It became clear that retired General Anthony Zinni’s mockery of Chalabi and his group as “Rolex wearing, silk-suited guys in London” that enjoyed little support inside Iraq, though a jejune remark, proved correct.[52] Depending on such long-exiled opposition leaders later led to deep miscalculations that not only undermined the reconstruction effort, but also provided the U.S. with false intelligence.

False Assumptions in Reconstruction Planning

From the onset, preparations in the Bush Administration on the war in Iraq were unduly optimistic. According to Timothy Carney, a former U.S. ambassador serving as part of the reconstruction team, there was “too much reliance on Chalabi in those early days” during the pre-war reconstruction planning, alienating the C.I.A., the State Department and even other non-INC exiled Iraqis involved in planning for the Iraqi  reconstruction.[53] Chalabi and his group became a government-in-waiting that would flip the switch and somehow instantly transform Iraq, a country ravaged by years of war and harsh U.N. sanctions, into a liberal society.

Throwing their faith with Chalabi, the Pentagon ignored all the work of the State Department, which had conducted discussions and planning for a post-Saddam Iraq since June 2002. The State Department group, called the Future of Iraq Project, brought a wide array of exiled Iraqi leaders, ranging from monarchist to communist, with a wide range of Middle East and Iraqi specialist.[54] Despite the fact that the State Department investied nine months of research in reconstruction planning and published over 12 volumes of detailed plans and reports on how to proceed on a post-Saddam Iraq, the Defense Department shunned its work and created its own reconstruction plans, establishing the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).[55] As a military organization, the Department of Defense was and still is ill-suited for the difficult task of nation-building: it has neither the experience nor the experts required to understand the socio-political, religious and cultural character of the Iraqi peoples. In addition, since the office was created only nine weeks before the war would begin, the Pentagon struggled to find the appropriate people to staff the office; one senior Defense official admitted that even in January, only weeks before the war began, “we only had three to four people” working at ORHA.[56] Without a doubt, Defense reconstruction planning was too little and too late.

The poor level of planning became quickly apparent to the U.S. military forces as the transitioned from combat operations to stability and support operations (SOSA) – that is, postwar operations.  The Third Infantry Division of the U.S. Army issued a 293-page after-action report revealing a deep lack of postwar planning. The report outlined numerous instances of organizational failure of the operation. One instance is the confusion the Third Infantry Division, the tip of the spear of the U.S. ground offensive in Iraq and the first to reach outskirts Baghdad, experienced upon reaching the Saddam Airport. As stated in the report, they “did not have a fully developed plan for the transition to SASO and civil military operations in Baghdad prior to entering the city.”[57] Additionally, the report throws doubt on the constant assurances by military officials that there existed sufficient ground troops for the operations. In fact, the report states the lack of troops, ineffective rules on engagement, and lack of planning were partially responsible for the widespread looting in Baghdad:

As the division transitioned to SASO, it did not have sufficient forces or effective rules of engagement to control civilian looting and rioting throughout the city [of Baghdad]. Looting by the local civilians was a significant obstacle to the reestablishment of order in such a heavily populated area.[58]

As these reports point out, the Pentagon should not have been responsible for the reconstruction planning. It would have been better handled by the State Department and the intelligence agencies such as the CIA. These agencies are better versed in understanding the social, political, economic, and other factors involved in reconstruction and national building. Understanding and analyzing such factors are not within the realm of the Pentagon’s core competency.

Indeed, the disastrous efforts poured into reconstruction planning quickly materialized soon after the fall of Baghdad, which was greeted by widespread looting and lawlessness. If the United States is to “win the hearts and minds” of Iraqis, then every error is a dangerous one and, like bad first impressions, cannot be quickly overcome. Here is a quick summery of just some of the fundamental failures in reconstruction planning:

Summary

The Bush Administrations missteps and those of the Defense Department are placing the Iraqi project in jeopardy. Despite these difficulties, it must be remembered that the greater disasters, mentioned by many against the war, have been so far been averted. The biggest fear of a post- Saddam Iraq that it would lead to the immediate breakup of Iraq has, thus, far been thankfully averted. Some political pundits predicted a large revolt in the “Arab Street” during the start of the war, which a year later has yet to materialize.[68] Other commentators, like Seymour Hersh, went so far as to predicting an all out Iraqi attack against Israel to create a larger war.[69] Also, despite the poor post-war operations planning, Iraq has thus far averted a large scale refugee crisis of Iraqis fleeing Iraq, which some predicted would number over a million Iraqis.[70] Indeed, the U.S. has had some small successes in Iraq, including the arguably freest media among Middle Eastern states and the most liberal constitution in the Middle East.[71] While the gravest predicted disasters have been so far averted, the future of Iraq is still in peril and the U.S. can no longer afford for any more mistakes in Iraq. The U.S. must establish a strategic plan of action and take decisive action to be successful in Iraq.

Conclusion: Between Democracy and Iran

As National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice testified to the 9/11 Commission in April, the war in Iraq focuses on taking a grand “strategic vision” for the Middle East as the overarching transcending solution to militantism, terrorism, poverty, stagnation and other causes of instability in the region. [72] Rather than fighting a mere “Global War on Terror”, the Iraq war is about the remaking of the Middle East – transforming the very field from which much, but not all, of the world’s terrorism stems today.

One of the main assumptions behind the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the removal of Saddam Hussein was that it would open the path to a free liberal Iraq, setting off the domino effect throughout the region and transforming the Middle East into a democratic zone of peace. This would not only bring liberal ideals to the region, but more importantly bring lasting stability to a region beset with political and economic stagnation and authoritarianism. Lasting liberal stability in the Middle East is the strategic goal and strategic vision; this has been argued in this paper and may still materialize in the region.

However, the Bush Administration’s decision to let the Defense Department lead the reconstruction effort has led to a miserable policy failure, greatly damaging our chances of establishing a liberal democratic Iraq and a free Middle East. Pentagon’s over-reliance on a narrow group of exiled Iraqis for intelligence and post-Saddam planning has been the main factor in this policy failure, as well as the Pentagon’s inability to fully grasp and counter Iran’s influence and goals in Iraq. The al-Sadr upraising, which has resulted in over 100 U.S. deaths since the beginning of April 2004, is one major crisis brought on by this failure.[73] Sadly it is most likely not be the last one.

“Staying the Course” is what both President George W. Bush and Democratic Presidential Candidate John Kerry have stated as their immediate policy in Iraq.[74] While the June 30 deadline looms closer, the goals set for the deadline (a return of sovereignty) seem further away. But what is needed is not more troops and more resolve, but rather the ability for the U.S. to fashion and carry out military and political strategies that will maximize our chances for success in Iraq. The current Bush Administration, while having a bold and ambitious strategic vision for the Middle East, has failed miserably in constructing the correct policies needed to realize its grand vision.

While there are fears of Iraq turning into the next Vietnam if the United States stays or turning into a failed state if it pulls out, the worst case scenario brings an even greater danger. The worst case scenario is that of the United States as the Soviet Union in the Afghan-Soviet War. The removal of Saddam Hussein and the effective dismemberment of his military proved to be great gain for Iran. Not only has the U.S. intervention destroyed one of Iran’s greatest foes, Iran also feels that Iraq is now the Americans’ to lose and Iran’s to gain. The Iranian government must be aware of the high stakes at hand: a successful Shiite-led democracy as its neighbour represents as a real and direct threat to the Iranian government and clerics.

In the Afghan-Soviet War, Russia was the invading force attempting to install and support a communist regime in Afghanistan, while fighting mujahideen with support by the U.S. via Pakistan. Though a rough and imperfect analogy, it appears that the U.S. is now playing the role of the Soviet Union in Iraq, with reports that Iran is backing leaders like Muqtada al-Sad, who led uprisings in April 2004 in Iraq.[75] Al-Sadr shares the same theological support for velayet-e-faqih (belief in clerical supremacy, supported by Ayatollah Khomeini) with Iran and is considered as some as a “proto” Khomeini.[76] If Iran succeeds and helps establish in an Iraqi government fashioned after its own, this will be a triumph for religious extremism and a deadly blow to liberal ideals in the region.

Whatever position Americans and the international community have on the U.S. decision to go to war, all must recognize that the heart of the Middle East is at stake. The decision to invade Iraq is a fait-accompli and cannot be undone, but it is the future of Iraq and the future of the entire Middle East that is still uncertain. The United States and, indeed, the world, cannot risk failure in Iraq.

Daniel Riveong is majoring in International Relations with a concentration in Intelligence and Security Issues. He hopes to further his studies at a graduate school in the area of war studies or strategic studies. Daniel is currently a researcher in the Eurasian Program at the Nathan Hale Foreign Policy Society.

[1] Hendawi, Hamza. “U.S. forces tear down posters in Baghdad”. Associated Press. 09 April 2004, Via LexisNexis.

[2] Rumsfeld, Donald. "Memo: Global War on Terrorism." 16 October 2003. Global Security. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/dod/rumsfeld-d20031016sdmemo.htm> (17 November 2003).

[3] Clinton, Bill. “State of the Union Address.” 25 January 1994. <http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/projects/presproject/idgrant/sou_pages/clinton2su.html> (17 November 2003).

[4] For an insightful summary on neoconservative thought, please see the Foreign Policy article “Neocons” by Max Boot (January/February 2004).

[5] Kristol, William, and Robert Kagan. “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy”. Foreign Affairs. Jul/Aug96, Vol. 75, Issue 4. Via Ingenta.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Truman, Harry. “President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947”. 12 March 1947. United States Department of State. <http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/funddocs/truman.txt> (03 November 2003).

[8] Irving Kristol, the “father” of neoconservatism, wrote that neoconservatism is not a movement nor an ideology per se, but rathe r a “persuasion” like Jacksonion America, see: Irving Kristol, “The Neoconservative Persuasion”, The Weekly Standard, 11 August 2003, <http://www.weeklystandard.com/
Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/000tzmlw.asp> (04 April 2004).

[9] Barnett, Thomas P.M. “The Pentagon’s New Map.” Esquire. March 2003.
<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/ThePentagonsNewMap.htm> (17 November 2003).

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] White House. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism. February 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/ counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf> (04 April 2003), pg. 23.

[13] Unknown. “Transcript: Discussion with Thomas Barnett” CNN. 26 February 2003. <http://www.nwc.navy.mil/newrulesets/CNN%20Blitzer%20interview.htm> (13 November 2003).

[14] Clinton, Bill. “Clinton Says ‘We had to act and act now’ Against Iraq Dec. 16.” 16 December 1998. <http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/12/16/98121652_tlt.html> (25 October 2003).

[15] Clinton, Bill. “Clinton Remarks on Iraq at the Pentagon Feb. 17.” 17 February 1998. Federated Association of Scientists. 01 November 2003. <http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/02/17/98021704_tpo.html> (01 November 2003).

[16] Bush, George W. “State of the Union Address.” 19 January 2002. White House.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (03 November 2003).

[17] White, David. “Conflict With Iraq: Raids designed to give clear message.” The Financial Times. 19 January 1993. Accessed: Lexis Nexis

[18] No Authro. “Clinton defends strikes to make Saddam ‘pay a price for brutality.’” Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 3 September 1996. Accessed: Lexis Nexis.

[19] No Author. “1998 Iraqi Climbdown averts air strikes.” BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/
onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/15/newsid_2519000/2519117.stm> (03 October 2003).

[20] Garamone, Jim. "U.S. Strikes Aimed at Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction". American Forces Information Services. 16 December 1998. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec1998/n12171998_9812172.html> (01 November 2003).

[21] See Clinton, William. “Statement by the President on Iraq Liberation,” White House. 31 October 1998. <http://clinton6.nara.gov/1998/10/1998-10-31-statement-by-the-president-on-iraq-liberation-act-of.html> (01 November 2003) and Bush, George W. "Presidential Determination of Designations Under the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998." U.S. Department of State. 09 December 2002. <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/15859.htm> (01 November 2003).

[22] No Author. “300,000 Iraqis may be in mass graves.” BBC News. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3253783.stm> (08 November 2003).

[23] Howard, Jane. "Kurd claims confirmed." The Guardian. 17 October 1998. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,793916,00.html> (03 December2003).

[24] David Wallis. “Ex-weapons inspector berates war plans.” San Francisco Examiner. 14 September 2002. <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2002/09/14/MN81272.DTL> (14 September 2002).

[25] Blair, David. “Saddam Hussein 100pc poll victor with 100pc turnout”. Daily Telegraph. 17 October 2002. Via LexisNexis. and David Blaire. “Iraqis get chance to just say yes to Saddam”. Daily Telegraph. 15 October 2002. Via LexisNexis.

[26] Blair, David. “Saddam Hussein 100pc poll victor with 100pc turnout”.

[27] Gallup Poll Organization, “What Form of Government for Iraq?”, 26 September 2003.

[28] Ibid.

[29] U.N. Human Development Programme. “Arab Human Development Report 2003”. 20 October 2003, pg. 19.

[30] Bush, George W. “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East.” 6 November 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html> (06 November 2003).

[31] Reynolds, Paul. “The ‘Democratic Domino’ Theory.” BBC News. 10 April 2003. <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/
print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2935969.stm> (03 December 2003).

[32] Bush, George W. “President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East.” 6 November 2003. The White House. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html> (17 November 2003.).

[33] Burkeman, Oliver. “Liberal democracy will be difficult to achieve.” The Guardian. 15 March 2003. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,914518,00.html > (12 November 2003).

[34] Starr, Harvey. “Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 35, No. 2, Democracy and Foreign Policy: Community and Restraint (Jun.,1991), pg. 356-381.

[35] Ibid, 375.

[36] Ibid, 375.

[37] Ibid, 376.

[38] Clinton, Bill. “State of the Union Address.” American Presidency. 25 January 1994. <http://www.polsci.ucsb.edu/projects/presproject/idgrant/sou_pages/clinton2su.html> (13 September 2003).

[39] Clinton, Bill. "The Rights and Aspirations of the Peoples of the Middle East". 09 July 2003. White House. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/07/20030709-4.html> (23 October 2003).

[40] Bush, George W. “West Point Graduation Address.” 01 June 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/ nss.pdf> (04 April 2003), pg. 11.

[41] Russett, Bruce, and John R. Oneal. 1999. “The Kantian Peace: the Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992.” World Politics 52 (October): 1-37.

[42] Babst, Dean V. "A Force For Peace," Industrial Research (1972) pp. 55-58.

[43] Ray, James Lee 1995. Democracy and International Politics: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, pp. 90.

[44] More information regarding the Correlates of War can be found at http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj/. Since the 1960s, this project has being conducted by the University of Michigan and is the most authoritative source for raw data on environmental variables related to why nation-states may go to war.

[45] See both Ed Vulliamy. "US begins the process of 'regime change'". The Guardian. 06 April 2003. <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,6903,930794,00.html> (13 April 2004) and Angela Gunn. “Planning for Peace”. USA Today. 06 April 2003. <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-04-06-weblog.htm> (13 April 2004).

[46] United States. United States Department of State. “Duty to the Future: Free Iraqis Plan for a New Iraq”. <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/dutyiraq/> (04 April 2004).

[47] Reiff, David. “Blueprint for a Mess.” New York Times. 01 November 2003. <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/02/magazine/02IRAQ.html> (01 November 2003.).

[48] Vulliamy.

[49] No Author,"INC Forces Arrive in Southern Iraq to take part in the Campaign to Liberate Iraq". 06 April 2003 <http://www.iraqfoundation.org/news/2003/dapril/6_leadership.html> (06 April 2003)

[50] No Author. "Iraqi exiles headed to Iraq will be 'core' of new army." Jane's Defence Weekly. 06 April 2003. <http://www.janes.com/
regional_news/asia_pacific/news/jdw/jdw030406_1_n.shtml> (27 November 2003).

[51] Congressional Research Service,.“Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Effects and Post-War Governance”. CRS Report for Congress. 29 August 2003, pg. CRS-3.

[52] McKeone, Marion. "Washington's puppet in Baghdad: a silk-suited, Rolex-wearing felon". Sunday Tribune Ireland. 04 April 2003. Via LexisNexus. Pg.19-19.

[53] Rieff.

[54] Rieef.

[55] United States. United States Department of State. “Interview with Senior Editors Roundtable”. Department of State.  23 October 2003. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2003/25618.htm> (13 April 2004).

[56] No Author. "News Transcript: Backgrounder on Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance in Post-War".  United States Department of Defense. 11 March 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2003/t03122003_t0311bgd.html> (17 April 2004).

[57] United States Department of Defense. United States Army. “Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) After Action Report: Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Department of Defense, 2003. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military
/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf> (07 November 2003), pg. 17.

[58] United States Army, pg. 16.

[59] Schmitt, Eric. "Pentagon Contradicts General On Iraq Occupation Force's Size". New York Times. 28 February 2003. Sec. A, P.1, Col. 4. Via LexisNexus.

[60] Spiegel, Peter. "Pentagon sounds out troops for Iraq backup". Financial Times. 20April 2004. Via LexusNexus

[61] Haeri, Safa. “Miscalculations and misconceptions” Asia Times Online. 11 November 2003. <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/EK11Ak02.html> (17 April 2004).

[62] Fassihi, Farnaz et al. "Winning the Peace: Early U.S. Decisions on Iraq Now Haunt American Efforts". The Wall Street Journal.  19 April 2004. Sec. A1. Via Factiva.

[63] Fassihi.

[64] Fassihi and Rieef.

[65] Ibid.

[66] No Author. "US army admits killing Iraqi civilians". Al-Jazeera.Net. 06 March 2004. <http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/4A98C6FE-DB69-4F83-8CAE-F709B8E60340.htm> (23 April 2004) and FBIS. “Iraq-Iran: FBIS Report in English”, FBIS, 20 February 2004, via FBIS.

[67] No Author, "Help U.S. Marines Equip TV Stations in Iraq", Spirit of America, <http://www.spiritofamerica.net/req_12/request.html> (23 April 2004).

[68] Weiner Bernard. “The Charnel House Future: Why Bush & Co. Must be Stopped”. CounterPunch.com. 03 September 2002. <http://www.counterpunch.org/weiner0903.html> (12 April 2004).

[69] No Author. "Interview of Seymour Hersh, 'The New Yorker'". CNN. 04 March 2002> <http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0203/04/ltm.12.html> (14 April 2004).

[70] McDowell, Theodore. "Searching for a Christian Response to War". CounterPunch.com. 12 February 2003. <http://www.counterpunch.org/mcdowell02122003.html> (14 April 2003).

[71] Blair, Tony. “PM's speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet”. 10 November 2003.
Available on: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page4803.asp

[72] No Author. “Transcript: Testimony of Condeleezza Rice Before 9/11 Commission”. New York Times. 08 April 2004. <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/08/politics/08RICE-TEXT.html?ex=1082692800&en=81c44f9229830c61&ei=5070> (08 April 2004).

[73] Bash, Dana and Willie Lora. “U.S. support grows for more troops in Iraq”. CNN. 20 April 2004. <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/19/iraq.main/>

[74] Kagan, Robert and William Kristol. “Too Few Troops”. The Weekly Standard. 26 April 2004. <http://www.weeklystandard.com/
Content/Public/Articles/000/000/003/977ovnnr.asp>

[75] No Author, “Iranians protest against clerics”, BBC News, 11 June 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2980102.stm> (01 May 2004) and Jay Bushinsky, "Iran supporting Iraqi radicals, Arab dailies say", Washington Times, 15 April 2004, <http://www.washtimes.com/world/20040415-105756-4915r.htm> (18 April 2004).

[76] Rubin, Trudy. “Before the Window Shuts”. Philadelphia Inquirer. 02 July 2003. <http://www.philly.com/mld/inquirer/news/columnists/6214317.htm> (01 May 2004).